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For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the quality of 
cultural output, or whether the taste of the public also has merit. This paper tries to resolve 
that question empirically, using national finals of the Eurovision Song Contest. We show that 
experts are better judges of quality: the outcome of finals judged by experts is less sensitive 
to factors unrelated to quality than the outcome of finals judged by public opinion. Yet, ex-
perts are not perfect: their judgment does still depend on such factors. This is also the case in 
the European finals of the contest. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ancient wisdom has it that there is no arguing about tastes. Yet, for many centuries, artists, 
critics, philosophers and economists, amongst others, have done exactly that. In particular, 
they have argued about whether only specialists can assess the quality of art, or whether the 
taste of the general public also has some merit.
1 On one end of the spectrum, there are those 
that argue that “producers of popular culture tend to aim their offerings at the lowest common 
denominator thereby degrading cultural products by catering to the relatively uncultivated 
tastes of ordinary consumers”
2 (see Holbrook 1999 and the references therein). This concern 
dates back at least to Plato, who argued in The Republic that attempts to please the audience 
would decrease the quality of theatrical productions. Adherents of this view thus argue that 
judgments of the artistic merits of cultural production should be left to experts who are famil-
iar with the particular art form, and who can put the offerings into their proper perspective. 
  On the other end of the spectrum, there are those that argue that market competition 
“augments rather than undermines the quality and quantity of cultural creations”
 3. Economic 
incentives encourage artists to address the needs and interests of audiences. Economists and 
even critics and philosophers, the argument goes, cannot judge objectively the quality of art, 
just as a central planner will not be able to decide on the proper production and allocation of 
goods and services. Such jobs can only be done by the market, i.e. by the general public. One 
of the most outspoken proponents of this view is Tyler Cowen (1998) who argues that “aes-
thetic judgments that divide “high” culture from “low” culture fail to appreciate adequately 
the vitality of commercial culture and the efficacy of market forces in stimulating and 
sustaining creativity in all areas of artistic expression.” Cowen dismisses people having such 
judgments as cultural pessimists, that “wish to supercede the workings of the market with 
their own moral and aesthetic judgments.”  
  It seems impossible to judge which of these views is correct, that is, whether experts 
or the general public are best able to judge the quality of cultural output.
4 Any attempt to do 
                                                            
1 Wijnberg (1995) distinguishes three basic types of selection system for such cases: market selection, peer se-
lection, and expert selection. In the case of market selection, the producers are the selected and the consumers 
are the selectors. In peer selection, on the other hand, the selectors and the selected are part of the same group. 
In the case of expert selection, the selectors are neither producers nor consumers, but have the power to shape 
selection by virtue of specialized knowledge and distinctive abilities. See also Wijnberg and Gemser (2000). 
2 Holbrook (1999), p. 144. 
3 The quotes in this paragraph are from Lipsitz (1999), in a review of Cowen (1998). 
4 In economics, there is a small literature that looks at how experts and the general public assess the quality of 
movies. Holbrook (1999) tries to assess which movie characteristics have a positive influence on either popular 
appeal or critical acclaim. Ginsburgh and Weyers (1999) claim that the general public is more time consistent in 
their evaluation of movies. This is based on the following observations. Box office receipts are strongly and  3
so, it seems, inevitably implies the need of making judgments about quality to start with. Ob-
viously, such an approach can never yield an objective evaluation of the judgment of quality. 
It seems that one cannot evaluate judgments of cultural merit without making such judgments 
oneself. Yet, in this paper, we do exactly that. We show that the judgment of quality by a 
team of experts is inefficient in a certain well-defined sense. Then we show that that ineffi-
ciency is also present in the judgment of the general public. However, the inefficiency in pub-
lic opinion is significantly higher than that in expert judgment. In that sense, we show that, at 
least in our case, expert judgment is superior, since it aggregates information in a way that is 
unambiguously better than that of the general public. Thus, we are not, and never will be, 
able to judge whether the evaluation criteria that are used by the general public to judge cul-
tural quality, are “better” or “worse” than the criteria used by experts. But we are able to 
show that, however appropriate or inappropriate those evaluation criteria may be, experts at 
least do a better job than the general public in using them to evaluate the quality of cultural 
output.  
  Our research is inspired by Glejser and Heyndels (2001; henceforth GH), who study 
the Queen Elizabeth International Music Competition, a prestigious classical music contest 
held annually in Brussels, and judged by a panel of jurors that are leading experts in their 
field. Finalists perform on six consecutive nights, with two finalists per night. The order in 
which contestants perform is drawn by lot. Yet, GH show that this order has a systematic in-
fluence on the final ranking. Finalists that perform later in the week, do significantly better on 
average. The second finalist on a given night does better than the first one. The authors inter-
pret this as evidence for the inefficiency of the jury process. If jurors really evaluate contest-
ants purely on their merit, then their order of appearance should not have an influence on the 
final ranking.
5  
  In this paper, we use data from the Eurovision Song Contest (henceforth ESC), an an-
nual festival organized by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), in which several coun-
tries participate, each with one song. Juries from all participating countries decide who is the 
winner, by awarding points to their favorite songs. The ESC is an annual event with a long 
history. It is shown live on television throughout Europe, and attracts roughly one hundred 
million viewers each year. We give further background on this contest in section 2. Up to 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
positively correlated with the number of times a movie appears on television after having been produced. There 
is a much large discrepancy however, between movies that win awards and those that make it to critics’ best 
movie lists many years later. 
5 Unless, of course, if the order of appearance influences the quality of the performance. There is little reason 
however to assume that this is the case.  4
1998, national juries consisted of experts that evaluated the songs and awarded points to the 
different contestants. In section 3, we study these festivals. We find that songs that are per-
formed later during the contest do significantly better, even though the order of appearance is 
determined randomly. This finding is consistent with GH.  
Usually, the song representing a country in the ESC is chosen in a National Final or 
National Song Contest (NSC) that is broadcast on national television. The EBU does not issue 
any strict rules as to how to select a song, but most countries choose a format that is very 
similar to that of the ESC itself, often involving separate regional juries. The number of entries 
in an NSC is usually around 10. In section 4, we extend the analysis by looking at NSCs. Inter-
estingly, jury procedures used to elect the national winner differ across countries and through 
time. Originally, expert juries were used. Yet, increasingly, countries use a system of televot-
ing, where each viewer can decide which song (s)he likes best, and then make a call to a 
phone number that is assigned to that particular song. In many countries, hundreds of thou-
sands of viewers make such a call. If it is true that experts are a better judge of quality than 
the general public, then we would expect that the inefficiency noted by GH and in section 4 of 
this paper, is much stronger in contests where the public decides, than it is in contests with an 
expert jury. Section 4 shows that this is exactly the case.   
Admittedly, few people would argue that the ESC represents high-brow culture. Many 
commentators claim that the participating songs are of dismal quality. Yet, as argued above, 
it is not up to us to judge the quality of the contestants of the ESC, or the overall quality of the 
festival. We are only interested in the extent to which experts and the public are able to 
evaluate the participating songs, and pick the best. Regardless of the extent to which we feel 
that they indeed pick the song with the highest quality, at least their choice should be purely  
based on the perceived merits of the song itself, and not on any exogenous factors that have 
nothing to do with the quality of the songs. When these factors, such as the order in which 




2. The Eurovision Song Contest: Background and details 
 
In the early 1950s, television networks were formed throughout Europe. To improve both 
quality and efficiency, networks in 10 countries
6 decided to join forces and establish the 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU). Under the Eurovision banner, the EBU started to distrib-
ute pan-European TV programs. In 1955 Marcel Benençon, Director General of Swiss Tele-
vision, proposed to also organize and broadcast a song contest, initially modelled after the 
San Remo Festival, established in 1951. The purpose of the contest is to “promote high-
quality original songs in the field of popular music, by encouraging competition among art-
ists, songwriters and composers through the international comparison of their songs.” 
(EBU/EUR 2001). On May 24, 1956 the first edition of the Eurovision Song Contest took place 
in Lugano, Switzerland. Seven countries participated, each with two songs. Since 1957 each 
country can participate with only one song. 
Each contest follows a by now standard format. First, after an initial introduction, the 
songs are performed in an order predetermined by lot.
7 Second, there is a break of about 5 
minutes, in which national juries can decide on their vote. Third, the votes of the national ju-
ries are revealed, following the same order as that of the actual contest. This stage takes 
roughly 30 minutes. Fourth, the winner is announced, and the winning song is performed 
once more. The entire show nowadays takes roughly 3 hours.  
Contestants are often relatively unknown at the time of the festival, although there are 
exceptions. In general, the song they perform is not written by themselves, but rather by some 
professional composer and songwriter. Songs have to be new, in the sense that they have not 
been recorded earlier. The original idea was that jurors would hear the songs for the very first 
time during the contest. This, however, is not always feasible. Since 1960, jury members are 
allowed to hear songs before the actual contest, but not to see them being performed. During 
the contest, songs are performed live.
8 Until the 1999 contest, all contestants in the ESC had 
musical backing from a symphony orchestra, provided by the host country. Sometimes, songs 
winning the ESC become huge hits, and winning artists manage to pursue a major national or 
international career.
9 In other cases, both the songs and their performers are soon forgotten. 
                                                            
6 These countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and West-Germany. 
7 For example, the draw for the 2002 contest took place on November 9, 2001 (see EBU/UER 2001). 
8 At least, the vocals are. Originally, it was allowed to have some instrumental backing on tape. Effective 1997, 
all instrumental backing can be on tape and only vocals have to be performed live. 
9 The most notable examples are Swedish band ABBA, who won the 1974 contest, and Canadian singer Celine 
Dion, who won in 1988 representing Switzerland.  6
Surprisingly, there are no restrictions on the nationality or citizenship of the perform-
ing artists or the composer of a song. Indeed, in the past it has often happened that winners 
were representing countries different from their own.
10 There have been restrictions, how-
ever, on the number of performers of a song. Starting in 1957, only 2 singers could be on 
stage, without any further vocal accompaniment. This rule was modified only in 1971, when 
the maximum was set to six performers. Also, since 1989 there is an age limit of 16. Since 
1962, the time limit for a song has been 3 minutes. 
A widely discussed issue is the freedom of language. In early contests there were no 
rules with regard to the language in which songs were performed. Yet, each contestant still 
chose to use her own language. This changed in 1965, when the Swedish contestant sang in 
English. This led to a restriction in place since 1966 that performers could only sing in (one 
of) the official language(s) of their country. It is often argued that this restriction gives a huge 
advantage to Ireland and the UK – the only countries allowed to perform in English. In 1973 
freedom of language was reinstated, but it was re-abolished in 1977. Since 1999, there has 
again been freedom of language.  
  The way in which the contest is judged has differed throughout the years. The exact 
details of the voting procedure for all the ESCs we consider is given in appendix A. In most 
cases, each participating country has a national jury that consists of a fixed number of mem-
bers. Each member awards points to her favorite songs. For each national jury, these points 
are aggregated to yield a ranking of the songs for that particular jury. Each country then 
awards points based on that ranking. Since 1975, a national jury’s favorite song receives 12 
points, their second favorite 10 points, while 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 point are awarded to the 
third through tenth favorite. Juries cannot award points to the song representing their own 
country. Only the points of a national jury are revealed – not that of its individual members. 
Points given by each national jury are aggregated and determine the final ranking. Jurors are 
only allowed to watch the voting procedure on television after the votes of their jury have 
been revealed, in an attempt to prevent strategic voting.  
In principle, every country that wants to can participate in the ESC. The only restric-
tions are that the contest has to be shown live on television in that country, and that the net-
work broadcasting the contest is a member of EBU. Membership is not restricted to European 
countries. In the past, for example, Morocco and Israel have been contestants in the ESC. Yet, 
since 1993, the number of countries wanting to participate has increased sharply. To prevent 
                                                            
10 This is particularly true for Luxemburg, that won the contest 5 times – but never while being represented by a 
singer with Luxemburg nationality.  7
the contest from running too long, this led to the introduction of different qualification 
mechanisms.
11 Hence, since 1993, a country that wants to participate is no longer guaranteed 
a spot in the contest. The exceptions to this rule are Germany, France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, the so-called Big Four. These countries contribute a large amount of the EBU’s 
budget and are therefore guaranteed participation.
12 Also, any other country is now guaran-
teed participation at least once every two years. 
 In  the ESC, the televoting system was introduced in 1998. Every citizen in a participat-
ing country can make a call to a phone number corresponding to her favorite song. Each 
household can only vote three times. Calls can be placed during a period of three minutes, 
after all contestants have performed. A country lacking the necessary infrastructure for tele-
voting uses the old system with 16 jury members. In either case, votes are translated per 
country to the now usual format of 12, 10, 8, 7, ..., 1 point. Countries with televoting have a 
back-up jury of 8 members, in case problems with televoting occur.
13 In some national finals, 
televoting has already been in use for a much longer time. 
Clearly the system with televoting is fundamentally different from the system with ju-
ries. Rather than a small number of carefully selected jurors, anyone with a phone can now be 
a part of the voting process. And many people choose to do so: in many countries, the num-
ber of people calling in to register their vote is in the hundreds of thousands. Therefore one 
can argue that, with televoting, public opinion determines the winner. With a jury system, the 
result is determined by experts, or at least by people that have been carefully selected and are 
committed to an honest and fair contest, and moreover realize that their vote can be of crucial 
importance in determining the winner of the contest. In our study of the ESC, we therefore re-
strict attention to those contests that have been judged by a jury. For the NSCs, we test for the 
difference between a jury of experts and public opinion, by taking advantage of the fact that 
some NSCs are judged by a jury of experts, while others are decided by televoting. 
                                                            
11 In 1993 there was a pre-contest in which 7 countries competed for 3 places in the ESC. In 1994 the 7 worst-
performing countries were not allowed to participate in the following year. In 1996 there was a pre-selection, 
where all countries that wanted to participate had to send their song on tape to the EBU. A system of national 
juries then decided which countries could participate in the actual contest. In 1997 the qualifying stage changed 
again. Each country could now participate at least once every two years. The other contestants were the winner 
of the previous year, plus the countries with the highest average score during the previous 5 years. Since 2001, 
the 13 highest-scoring countries in a given year automatically qualify for the next year. The numbers 14 and 15 
may also do – dependent on the exact number of members of the Big Four that qualifies among the highest-
scoring countries. 
12 Italy is also entitled to participate in every single contest, as a tribute to the fact that the contest was modelled 
on the San Remo festival. However, Italy chooses to no longer exercise that right: since 1994, it has only par-
ticipated once. 
13 Such a case occurred for example in the Netherlands in 2000, when transmission of the ESC was interrupted 
to allow for news coverage on a major accident that took place in the town of Enschede.  8
 
 
3. Inefficiency in the ESC 
 
In this section, we test for efficiency in the ESC. Note that the order of appearance in a contest 
is randomly drawn. Therefore, the final ranking of the songs should not be influenced by this 
order. A jury is supposed to determine the final ranking of the contestants purely on the basis 
of the quality of the songs. Any evidence of a systematic influence of a factor that is exoge-
nous to the quality of the songs therefore implies inefficiency in the jury’s decision making 
process (for an extensive discussion, see GH). The order of appearance clearly is such a fac-
tor. In this section, we therefore test to what extent the order of appearance influences the fi-
nal ranking in the ESC, while also taking other potentially important factors into account.  
We collected data for all ESCs in the period 1957-1997. Data from order of appearance 
and final ranking are taken from Eeuwes (2002) and Walraven and Willems (2000), but are 
also available from many other websites. Starting in 1998, an increasing number of countries 
started to use televoting to determine their votes in the ESC. Therefore, these contests are not 
included. We concentrate solely on contests that only use expert judgments. This gives us a 
total of 41 festivals. Some summary statistics are given in table 1. For each contestant, we 
observe its order of appearance in the festival where it participated. Since not all festivals 
have the same number of contestants, we normalize these values to the interval [0,1]. In a 
contest with n participants, the contestant that performs as number i of the evening, has a 
value for APPEARANCE that equals (i-1)/(n-1). Hence the first contestant gets a value of zero, 
and the last contestant a value of one. We use the same normalization for the variable RANK, 
which gives the place of a contestant in the final ranking. For example, suppose a festival has 
21 contestants. A certain contestant performs as the 6
th of the evening, and is number 15 in 
the final ranking. The observation for APPEARANCE for this contestant then equals 0.25 and 
the observation for RANK equals 0.70. In the case of ties, each of the tying contestants is 
awarded a ranking that is equal to the average of all rankings in that tie.  
  It is often observed that some countries almost always do particularly well at the ESC, 
while others perform particularly badly. The United Kingdom, for example, managed to se-
cure second place in no less than 15 festivals, and won another 6. To allow for systematic 
quality differences in the contributions of the different countries, we have included country  9
dummies. A total of 35 countries have participated in the ESC in our sample period.
14 Obvi-
ously, this implies that only 34 country dummies can be used. For ease of interpretation, we 
use as a benchmark the country with the most “average” performance over all contests in our 
sample. This turned out to be Denmark: the average value of RANK for this country is 0.49. 
The coefficients of the country dummies should thus be interpreted as how well particular 
countries are doing, ceteris paribus, relative to the average participating country – which 
happens to be Denmark. 
Also, the country hosting an ESC (as a rule, this is the winner of the previous year) al-
ways seems to do particularly well. This can be due to the fact that the host country puts par-
ticular effort in selecting a fitting song. Alternatively, the other countries may be willing to 
judge the contribution of the host country more sympathetically. We therefore include a 
dummy for the host country as well. Finally, we allow for the possibility that one type of con-
testant performs better than another type. Specifically, many observers seem to be of the 
opinion that as a rule female singers rank better than male singers. We have therefore divided 
the 758 contestants in our data set into four categories: male singers, female singers, duos, 
and groups. For the first three categories, we include a dummy. Data are on the types of con-
testants were found using Walraven and Willems (2000) and numerous websites, in particular 
Eilers (2002). 
In column I of table 2, we explain the final ranking of a contestant at an ESC from its 
order of appearance plus a dummy for the host country, a dummy for the country the contest-
ant is representing
15, and a dummies for a solo male performer, solo female performer, and 
duo. The equation is estimated using ordinary least squares. We have only reported the coun-
try dummies that are significant at the 5%-level. These fall into two groups: those for coun-
tries that do systematically better, and those for countries that do systematically worse than 
the average country. The first group consists of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and France. 
Countries in the second group are Finland, Norway, Portugal and Turkey. The performance 
of the United Kingdom is especially impressive. On average, in a contest with 20 partici-
pants, the artist representing this country has a final ranking that is 5.5 places better than the 
average country. The artist representing Turkey, however, has a final ranking that is more 
                                                            
14 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Morocco, 
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Roumania, Slovenia, Slowakia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and,Yougoslavia,. Most former communist countries have only partici-
pated since the 1990s. 
15 Except when this is Denmark. See above.  10 
than 4 places worse than the average country. The HOST dummy is also significant. None of 
the type-of-performer dummies are. 
Conventional wisdom has it that the song that is performed as the very first one in a 
contest has a better chance of winning. To test for this, we included the dummy OPENING, 
which equals 1 if and only if the particular song was performed as the first one of a contest. 
Column II in table 2 shows that the coefficient for OPENING is indeed negative and signifi-
cant. This could be due to some non-linearity in the true relationship between RANK and 
APPEARANCE, which is not explicitly modelled in our specification, but is picked up by 
OPENING. As a robustness check, we therefore also included a dummy SECOND, which equals 
1 if and only if a song was performed as the second of a contest. If the negative coefficient of 
OPENING is indeed due to non-linearity, then the coefficient of SECOND should also be nega-
tive and significant. Column III of table 2 shows that this is not the case: the effect of SECOND 
is insignificant. Also, including this dummy has little influence on the estimated effect of 
OPENING. Hence, there is truly an effect of being the first performer during an ESC.
16 There-
fore, column II in table 2 is our preferred specification. 
As noted, when a jury bases its decision purely on the merits of the song under con-
sideration, the final ranking should be independent of the order of appearance. This is evi-
dently not the case in our data: the coefficient of APPEARANCE is negative and significant at 
the 0.1%-level. Hence, a song that is performed later during the contest stands a much better 
chance of obtaining a low value for RANK, and therefore does better on average. This is in 
line with Glejser and Heyndels (2001). The coefficient of APPEARANCE that we find, 0.124, 
implies that ceteris paribus a song that is performed last has a final ranking that is 12% better 
than a song that is performed near the beginning of the contest. For a contest with 20 partici-
pants, this boils down to roughly 2.3 places in the final ranking. Yet, we also see that the very 
first performer has a clear advantage relative to this effect: the coefficient of OPENING is sig-
nificant and equal to 0.127. Interestingly, this is virtually the same value as the one we find 
for APPEARANCE. This implies that on average the very first and the very last song perform 
equally well. Apart from this, there is a negative relation between appearance and final rank-
ing. 
We thus find new evidence that juries are influenced by factors that should have no 
influence on their opinion: in this case the order of appearance of the contestants. So far we 
                                                            
16 We also tested whether there is an additional effect of being the last performer, by including a dummy 
CLOSING. This dummy, however, was not significant. As a further test for non-linearity, we used Ramsey’s 
RESET-test (Ramsey 1969). This also provided no evidence for non-linearity.  11 
have looked only at contests that have an expert jury. In the next section we look at a differ-
ent data set, that of national finals. Here, final rankings are sometimes determined by a jury 
of experts, and sometimes by the general public. We take advantage of this heterogeneity to 
test whether the inefficiency that we identified in this section is stronger for public opinion or 
for expert juries. 
 
 
4. National Finals: Expert Judgment versus Public Opinion 
 
To test the main hypothesis of this paper, we used Stoddart (2002) to obtain data for a total of 
70 national finals (for a full list, see appendix B). Most national finals are judged exclusively 
by an expert jury. But in recent years, the number of countries that exclusively use televoting 
to determine their national final has increased. There are also a number of countries that use 
some combination of both systems. We do not use those contests. We use data from finals 
that are as recent as possible. Summary statistics are given in table 1. Note that 9 out of the 
26 televoting contests were held in the UK, which used televoting as early as 1988. For the 
purposes of this study, we could pool all our data, of both ESCs and NSC. But the ESCs have a 
different format and an element of international competition that is lacking in NSCs. Also, the 
number of contestants in an ESC is often much higher than that in an NSC. To avoid any possi-
ble influence these factors may have, we therefore restrict attention to the NSCs. 
  To test the difference between expert jury and public opinion, it is convenient to have 
a single coefficient that uniquely captures the inefficiency of the voting process. This can be 
done as follows. In vector notation, the equation we want to estimate is 
RANK = α  + β  APPEARANCE + ε ,     (1) 
with ε  a vector of iid error terms. Yet, this specification imposes too much structure. When 
we do not use any additional dummies, the intercept α  fully determines the slope β . When α  
is higher, the absolute value β  necessarily has to be higher as well. This can be seen as fol-
lows. Note that we have normalized both RANK and APPEARANCE to lie in the interval [0,1]. 
By construction, the average value for both RANK and APPEARANCE equals 0.5. By virtue of 
ordinary least squares, the regression line given by (1) therefore necessarily passes through 
(0.5, 0.5). Writing RANK as a function of APPEARANCE, we thus have RANK(0) = α , RANK(1) = 
α  + β , and RANK(0.5) = 0.5. But given that RANK is linear, this implies that we must have 
0.5 – α  = α  + β  – 0.5  12 
or 
β  = 1 – 2α . 
Plugging this back into (1) yields 
RANK = α  +  (1 – 2α ) APPEARANCE + ε , 
or 
RANK – APPEARANCE = α  (1 – 2* APPEARANCE) + ε . 
By defining the transformed variables TRANSRANK ≡  RANK – APPEARANCE and TRANSAPPEAR 
≡  1 – 2* APPEARANCE, we can thus find an unbiased estimate for α  (and, by implication, β ) by 
regressing TRANSRANK on TRANSAPPEAR, since we now have 
TRANSRANK = α  TRANSAPPEAR + ε .     (2) 
  Define the dummy EXPERT to equal 1 if and only if the observation is from an NSC 
with an expert jury. Note that we have defined the inefficiency of the jury process as the ex-
tent to which β  differs from 0, that is, the extent to which α  differs from 0.5. Thus, televoting 
is less efficient than an expert jury when the value of α  is significantly higher for observa-
tions with televoting. We can test for this by interacting EXPERT with TRANSAPPEAR and add-
ing that expression to the equation above: 
TRANSRANK = α  TRANSAPPEAR + γ  (TRANSAPPEAR*EXPERT) + ε .   (3) 
When expert juries are indeed more efficient than public opinion, the value of γ  should be 
negative. 
  Table 3 gives the result of this regression. Note that the coefficient of TRANSAPPEAR is 
highly significant. The t-statistic reported here is that for the hypothesis that the coefficient 
equals 0.5: this is the case in which the jury process is efficient. The second thing to note is 
that the coefficient of the interacted variable is indeed negative and significant, with a p-value 
of 0.0171. This establishes that public opinion leads to a decision that is arguably inferior to 
that of a team of experts. Hence, at least in our case, experts are a better judge of quality than 
the general public.
17 
Of course, one could argue that these contests are only about winning, and that the 
exact ranking of all the other, non-winning contestants really does not matter that much. For 
that reason, we also looked at the average value of APPEARANCE for all the contestants that 
went on to win their contest. In contests with televoting, this value equals 0.641, and in con-
tests with expert juries 0.609. This confirms our results: on average, winning contestant per- 13 
form later in the contest than one would expect based on a random draw. Moreover, in con-
tests with televoting, winning contestants on average perform even later than in contests with 
expert juries. 
Figure 1 summarizes the results of our regression analyses. When the jury process is 
efficient, the order of appearance should have no systematic effect on the final ranking of a 
contestant. In that case, any value of APPEARANCE should on average lead to a final RANK that 
equals 0.5. This is given by the dotted line. The two heavy lines give the estimated relation-
ships between APPEARANCE and RANK for the two different NSC samples: the one with 
televoting and the one with expert juries. For reference, we also give the line that is implied 
by the coefficient estimate of 0.124 that we found for the variable APPEARANCE in the ESC 
sample. We calibrated this line such that it also passes through the point (0.5, 0.5). Note that 
the inefficiency in the televoting sample is remarkably large. The regression result implies 
that, ceteris paribus, the song that is performed first has a rank that is on average 0.245 lower 
than the song that is performed last. In a contest with 11 contestants, this boils down to 





The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, following Glejser and Heyndels (2001), we 
provided additional evidence that there are ordering effects when judging music. We did so 
using two new data sets: one for international finals of the Eurovision Song Contest, and one 
for national finals. Moreover, we showed that an ordering effect exists not only for contests 
judged by experts, but also for those judged by the general public. Also in the contests we 
consider, participants that perform later do better on average, regardless of the fact that the 
order of appearance is determined randomly. In addition, we found evidence that the very 
first contestant also does substantially better on average. Why these order effects exist, re-
mains a mystery. One may argue that jurors are better able to remember the performance of 
later contestants, while the performance of the very first contestant also sticks in their mind. 
But a priori it is not clear why jurors would judge contestants they remember well, more fa-
vorably than contestants of whom their memories have faded.  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
17 Note that (3), the equation we estimate, only follows from (1), the original specification, under the assumption 
that RANK(0.5) = 0.5. When we add dummies to the original specification, this condition is no longer satisfied. 
Therefore, it does not make sense to add dummies for e.g. the opening act or the type of performer to (3).  14 
Order effects can be a major source of economic inefficiency, not only in cultural 
contests, but also in other contexts where the quality of several candidates needs to be com-
pared. Examples include job interviews and the grading of exams. Our results suggest that job 
candidates that either are the very first, or among the last to be interviewed, stand a better 
chance of being hired. Indeed, other fields also have started to address the relevance of order-
ing effects. For example, Stewart et al. (2001) use survey data to assess the public’s willing-
ness to pay for three different health care programs. They find that the order in which the 
three programs are presented to respondents has an influence on their willingness to pay. 
  The second and more innovative contribution of this paper is that we shed new light 
on the age-old question as to whether experts or the general public are better able to assess 
the quality of cultural output. To do so, we developed a method that enables us to address this 
question without having to resort to subjective quality judgments. We showed that, at least in 
our data, experts are unambiguously better judges of quality, in that the outcome of contests 
judged by experts are less sensitive to exogenous factors that clearly do not influence the 
quality of output. Nevertheless, we showed that experts are not perfect, in the sense that their 
judgment does depend on such factors. 
  Of course, our results are only shed light on part of the debate on the merit of expert 
judgment versus public opinion. It could very well be that the current public is a better pre-
dictor of the views of future experts, than are current experts. A stronger ordering effect from 
the public does not rule out greater prescience at the same time. The standards that experts 
apply may still be inferior, in whatever sense, to the standards the common man applies. But 
we do show that, at least, experts apply these standards more consistently. 
Admittedly, the data we used in this paper, those for Eurovision Song Contests, are a 
bit unusual, and not the first that spring to mind when one considers studying the judgment of 
quality of cultural output. Yet, the character of the data, with contests that are very similar 
and only differ in that some are judged by experts and some by the general public, provides a 
unique opportunity to test for differences between the two. We do believe that our results also 
generalize to other cases where the quality judgment of cultural output is an issue. 
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APPENDIX A: May I Have Your Votes, Please. 
 
Throughout the years, the voting procedure in the ESC has often been changed. In this appen-
dix we give the details for all contests. We only document the changes in the procedure, from 
year to year. If a year is not listed, the voting procedure has not been changed.
18  
In the first contest, in 1956, every country sent 2 jurors. Each juror rated each song, 
including that of her own country, on a scale from 1 to 10. For this contest, however, only the 
winner was announced, not the ranking of the other participants. Therefore, we do not include 
it in our data. In 1957, each national jury consisted of 10 jurors. Each juror voted for her fa-
vorite song. The number of votes determined the final ranking. In 1959 professional compos-
ers and publishers were banned from being a juror.  
In 1962 the voting system changed again. Each juror could now choose three songs, 
awarding 3 points to her favorite, 2 to the second best and 1 to the third best. These points 
were aggregated to determine a ranking for each national jury. Each national jury then gave 
3, 2, and 1 point to its three highest-ranked songs. In 1963 national juries were expanded to 
20 members. Jurors now awarded 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 point to their 5 favorite songs. This was 
aggregated to a vote of 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 point for each national jury. In 1964 juries were 
scaled back to 10 members. Jurors could now divide 9 points freely over all (other) countries. 
Points were aggregated over national juries and, translated to 5, 3 and 1 point national jury’s 
three favorite songs.
19 In 1966 the EBU decided that members of every national jury should 
consist of representative members the public. Juries were allowed to have light music and 
pop music experts but no professional composers, record manufacturers or publishers. The 
voting system of 1957, where each juror only voted for her favorite song, was reintroduced in 
1967.  
Another change took place in 1971. Each country now had only 2 jurors, one under 
and one over 25 years of age. Each juror rated all songs on a scale from 1 to 5. All the indi-
vidual scores were added to determine the final ranking in the contest. In 1974 national juries 
again consisted of 10 members, 5 under and 5 over 25, and preferrably 5 men and 5 women. 
Minimum age was 16, maximum 60, with at least a 10 year age difference between the 
youngest and the oldest member. Each juror voted for her favorite song. In 1975, national ju-
                                                            
18 Source: Schwarm-Bronson (2001).  
19 In theory, we could have a case in which all jurors of a national jury awarded all of their points to just one 
song. Should that occur, all 9 points of a national jury would have been awarded to that song. When only two 
songs were to receive points from a national jury, this would have been translated to 6 points for the highest-
scoring song, and 3 points for the other. These contingencies, however, did not occur.  16 
ries had 11 members. Every member rated all songs on a scale from 1 to 5. Based on the total 
scores of its national jury, each country then awarded 12 points to its favorite song, 10 points 
to its second-favorite, and 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 point to its third- through tenth-favorite. 
This system was still in use in 1997, the end of our sample.  
Since 1988 each national jury in the ESC has 16 members, with 4 aged between 15 and 
25, 4 aged between 26 and 35, 4 between 36 and 45, and 4 between 46 and 60. People with an 
interest in the music industry were barred from being a juror. Every jury member now rated 
songs on a scale from 1 to 10. The final vote system did not change. Nowadays, the tie-
breaking rule is that the song that has received the highest number of maximum scores (i.e. 
12 points) wins. In case that number is also equal, the number of second-highest scores is de-




APPENDIX B: Sample of National Finals 
 
Starting from 2001 and working backwards, we used data from all available national finals 
that either exclusively used televoting, or exclusively used expert juries and had at least 7 
contestants. We used all such national finals for which data are available, going back to 1988 
for televoting, and to 1993 for expert juries.  
 
                                                            
20 The 1969 contest had no less than 4 winners, but in that year, there was no tie-breaking rule yet in place.  17 
The national finals that are included in our data are the following: 
 
TELEVOTING EXPERT  JURIES   
Belgium 1998,  2000  Austria  1994 
Denmark 1997  Bosnia-Herzegovina  1999,  2001 
Finland  1994, 1996  Croatia  1993, 1994, 1997 
Germany  1997, 1999-2001  Cyprus  1993, 1994, 1997-2000 
Great Britain  1988-1995, 2000  Estonia  1993-2001 
Iceland 2001  Finland  1993 
Ireland 1999-2001  Hungary  1994,  1997 
FYR Macedonia  1998 Iceland  1993 
Romania  2000  Ireland  1993, 1994, 1997, 1998 
Slovenia 1997,  1998  Israel  1993 
   Malta  1997-2000 
    the Netherlands  1993, 1994 
   Norway  1993,  1996 
    Portugal  1996, 1998, 1999 
   Slovenia  1993 
   Sweden  1997 
   Switzerland  1993 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
ESC           NSC expert     NSC televoting  
Year       1957-1997   1993-2001   1988-2001 
 
Male       0.306 
Female   0.447 
Duo       0.117 
Group     0.129 
 
Observations    758          492    256 
Contests        41          44      26 
Partic. per contest    18.49       11.18    9.85       20 
Table 2. Estimation results ESC (dependent variable: RANK. t-values in parentheses). 
 
          I         II       III 
 
Constant      0.551
***      0.576
***      0.562
*** 
        (9.11)     (9.44)     (9.09) 
Appearance     -0.086
**     -0.124
***     -0.105
** 
      (-2.59)   (-3.44)     (-2.67) 
 
 
Host        -0.110
*     -0.110
*     -0.110
* 
      (-2.43)   (-2.42)   (-2.44) 
 
 
United Kingdom   -0.293
***     -0.286
***     -0.286
*** 
      (-4.33)   (-4.24)   (-6.29) 
Ireland     -0.213
**     -0.202
**     -0.202
** 
      (-2.99)   (-2.85)   (-2.85)      
France    -0.206
**     -0.198
**     -0.197
** 
      (-3.03)   (-2.93)   (-2.91) 
 
 
Belgium              0.134
*      0.133
* 
              (1.99)     (1.98) 
Finland      0.199
**      0.210
**      0.210
** 
        (2.86)     (4.19)     (3.02)   
Norway      0.136
*      0.137
*      0.140
* 
        (1.99)     (2.02)     (2.05) 
Portugal      0.170
*      0.183
**      0.185
*** 
        (2.44)     (2.62)     (2.66) 
Turkey      0.217
**      0.214
**      0.209
* 
        (2.66)     (2.63)     (2.57) 
 
 
Male        0.043      0.038      0.038 
        (1.26)     (1.11)     (1.10) 
Female    -0.029     -0.034     -0.036 
      (-0.89)   (-1.06)   (-1.10) 
Duo        -0.049     -0.054     -0.056 
      (-1.19)   (-1.31)   (-1.36) 
 
Opening           -0.127
**     -0.114
*
         (-2.63)   (-2.29) 
Second            0.062 
              (1.29) 
 
*** significant at 0.1%-level 
**  significant at 1%-level 
*   significant at 5%-level 
 
 
Note: All country dummies (except Denmark) are included in all regressions. Only country dummies that are 
significant at the 5% level are reported in the table. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon 
request. Column II is the preferred specification.  21 
Table 3. Estimation results NSC (dependent variable: TRANSRANK. See main text for defini-
tions of variables. t-values in parentheses). 
 
 
Transappear          0.623
**     
           (4.02) 
(Transappear)*expert      -0.091
* 
         (-2.39) 
**   significant at 1%-level 
*    significant at 5%-level 
 
Note: the t-value reported for TRANSAPPEAR is for the null hypothesis that TRANSAPPEAR = 0.5.  
  22 
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